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ABSTRACT
INTELLIGENT NOVEL METHODS FOR IDENTIFYING CRITICAL COMPONENTS
AND THEIR COMBINATIONS FOR HYPOTHESIZED CYBER-PHYSICAL
ATTACKS AGAINST ELECTRIC POWER GRIDS
by
Ming Wang

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015
Under the Supervision of Dr. Lingfeng Wang

As a revolutionary change to the traditional power grid, the smart grid is expected to
introduce a myriad of noteworthy benefits by integrating the advanced information and
communication technologies in terms of system costs, reliability, environmental impacts,
operational flexibility, etc. However, the wider deployment of cyber networks in the
power grid will bring about important issues on power system cyber security. Meanwhile,
the power grid is becoming more vulnerable to various physical attacks due to vandalism
and probable terrorist attacks. In an envisioned smart grid environment, attackers have
more entry points to various parts of the power grid for launching a well-planned and
highly destructive attack in a coordinated manner. Thus, it is important to address the
smart grid cyber-physical security issues in order to strengthen the robustness and
resiliency of the smart grid in the face of various adverse events. One key step of this
research topic is to efficiently identify the vulnerable parts of the smart grid.

In this thesis, from the perspective of smart grid cyber-physical security, three critical
component combination identification methods are proposed to reveal the potential
vulnerability of the smart grid. First, two performance indices based critical component
ii

combination recognition methods are proposed for more effectively identifying the
critical component combinations in the multi-component attack scenarios. The optimal
selection of critical components is determined according to the criticality of the
components, which can be modeled by various performance indices. Further, the spacepruning based enumerative search strategy is investigated to comprehensively and
effectively

identify

critical combinations

of multiple same

or

different

types

of components. The pruned search space is generated based on the criticality of potential
target component which is obtained from low-order enumeration data. Specifically, the
combinatorial line-generator attack strategy is investigated by exploring the strategy for
attacking multiple different types of components. Finally, an effective, novel approach is
proposed for identifying critical component combinations, which is termed search space
conversion and reduction strategy based intelligent search method (SCRIS). The
conversion and reduction of the search space is achieved based on the criticality of the
components which is obtained from an efficient sampling method. The classic intelligent
search algorithm, Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO), is improved and deployed for
more effectively identifying critical component combinations.

MATLAB is used as the simulation platform in this study. The IEEE 30, 39, 118 and
Polish 2383-bus systems are adopted for verifying the effectiveness of the proposed
attack strategies. According to the simulation results, the proposed attack strategies turn
out to be effective and computationally efficient. This thesis can provide some useful
insight into vulnerability identification in a smart grid environment, and defensive
strategies can be developed in view of this work to prevent malicious coordinated multicomponent attacks which may initiate cascading failures in a cyber-physical environment.
iii
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Introduction
1.1 Research Background
Power grids play an increasingly important role with the rapid development of modern
society. After decades of evolution, the highly interconnected, complex power
systems have been built in most countries. The smart grid is an overview of the next
generation of power system, which is characterized by the broader use of communication
and information technologies in power generation, transmission, distribution, and
consumption. After entering the 21st century, with the rapid development of electronic
technologies, the latest cyber and communication equipment and devices are being more
widely integrated into the conventional power system to build the smart grid. Even
though the smart grid is expected to be more economical, efficient, environmentally
friendly as compared with the traditional power grid, new cybersecurity issues along with
the physical vulnerabilities are bringing new kinds of risks to the power grid nowadays.

Usually, to ensure the power supply reliability of the power grid, the N-1 or even N-1-1,
N-2 criterion is applied. For a power grid which is in compliance with the N-1 criterion, if
one component fails, in general no further losses could be caused. If multiple components
are compromised, the power grid is exposed to danger of cascading failures. Despite the
fact that many preventive measures have been enforced, large-scale power outages occur
at times. There are different causes which could result in cascading failures, such as
defects of power system control software, overloading of transmission lines, failures of
critical components, natural calamities and man-made sabotages, and so on. For example,
in 2003, the well-known Northeast blackout which was partially due to a software bug in
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the alarm system and has resulted in billions of economic losses and affected 55 million
people [1]. In 2005 in China, the whole Hainan province suffered a blackout due to the
powerful typhoon “DAMREY” [2]. In 2012, the India blackout which affected 6.7 billion
people was caused by the high load demand and the failure of an EHV substation [3]. On
February 25th, 2015, 80% citizens in Pakistan suffered a blackout caused by the loss of
one key transmission line as the result of a militant attack [4]. Of all the reasons that can
cause cascading failures, man-made sabotages are attracting more and more attention
since the terrorist threat to the power grid has been escalating. For the traditional power
grid, physical attack is the only feasible way for attackers to disrupt the power grid,
however it is difficult to attack multiple parts of the power system at the same time. But
in cyber attacks, attackers could be able to compromise multiple components
simultaneously through executing elaborate attack plans. Also, the combination of cyber
attacks and physical attacks is also a potential threat to the grid, which may cause even
more severe disruptions. These attacks may lead to an interruption of local or regional
area power supply; in serious cases, cascading failures could be caused. Here, some
representative attack-related cases are discussed.

Several cascading failures caused by physical attacks have been reported. For example, in
April 2013 in California, a Silicon Valley power substation which supplies electric power
to thousands of customers was destroyed by a meticulously planned attack, and it took
the utility company almost one month to repair and restore it. This incident served as a
warning sign to the power companies and regulators. As a result, new guidelines for
physical security are being implemented at the request of the FERC, including identifying
vulnerable critical components and implementing security enhancement plans [5].
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During the past years, a number of cyber-related accidents have occurred in different
power systems, which have raised concerns for the cybersecurity of the power grid in a
smart grid environment.

For example, a devastating virus named “Stuxnet” was first discovered in June 2010. It
was developed to interfere with the normal operation of the Siemens industrial software
which is deemed a severe potential threat to the proper operation of the power grid [6].

As concluded by the Repository for Industrial Security Incidents (RISI)’s 2011 annual
report, about 35 percent of the industrial control system (ICS) safety incidents were
triggered remotely via the cyber network [7], [8]. Since the ICS and SCADA systems
play a key role in ensuring the normal operation of the smart grid, more attention should
be paid to the emerging cybersecurity issues.

On November 4, 2006, more than 15 million people in Europe suffered a blackout which
was primarily caused by human errors. Deficient communication systems played an
important role in initiate and propagate this severe accident [9]. Thus, there is also
personnel vulnerability in operating the power grid.

Considering all these potential threats to the power system, in order to strengthen the
power grid to resist or sustain such risks, one possible way is to study the mechanism of
cascading failures and to identify the weak links of the power grid in order to protect and
harden it. An effective way to study the cyber-physical-personnel vulnerability of the
power grid is to investigate the probable attack methods against the power grid. In this
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thesis, the term “attacks” refers to all potential cyber, physical or hybrid cyber-physical
attacks in the contemporary power grids. Corresponding defensive schemes could be
stipulated accordingly based on the outcomes from this study. For instance, the real-time
statuses of critical transmission lines could be continuously monitored by the advanced
smart grid equipment, and important power stations and substations should be regularly
inspected by adequate field personnel.

Some attack strategies against power grids have been proposed in the existing literature.
For example, in [10], a flow betweenness based attack strategy against power grid was
proposed. A new critical line identification method is proposed according to the fault
chain theory in [11]. In [12], critical line identification methods are proposed based on
the complex network theory. In [13], a new method for identifying the most critical
substation in the power grid is proposed. In [14], joint line-substation attack model is
investigated and a component interdependency graph based attack strategy is proposed.

In recent years, the cyber-physical security issue of smart grid also has attracted much
attention. In [15], vulnerability detection and defensive strategies are proposed for the
cyber security of smart grid. A novel power control system communication network
security assessment method is proposed in [16]. In [17], a cyber-physical vulnerability
assessment framework is proposed for the security state evaluation in a smart grid
environment. In [18], a cyber-physical security evaluation approach is introduced for the
purpose of assessing potential cyber-physical contingencies. In [19], a communication
protection system is developed to enhance the reliability of smart grid.
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In order to effectively investigate the power system security issues, a powerful cascading
failure simulation tool is much needed. For a long time, modeling the cascading
outages in power systems was a demanding task. In section 1.2, the development trend of
cascading failure models as well as the deployed cascading failure simulation platform
are discussed in detail.

1.2 Cascading Failures in the Power Grid
The power system is one of the most complex man-made networks. A typical power
system mainly consists of generation, transmission and distribution parts. Electric power
flows from generators to distribution substations through transmission lines. Represented
by graph theory, substations can be denoted by nodes and transmission lines can be
denoted by links [20]. In the present cascading failure simulation platforms, cascading
failures usually occur due to the massive power flow shift especially in a high-voltage
power grid. In the current cascading failure simulation model, the developmental process
of cascading failures can be described in the following ways: The fault threshold of each
transmission line in the power grid is determined by its physical properties. Kirchhoff's
law states that if one component fails in the power grid, the load of this component will
be transferred to its nearby components. In general no further damage would be caused
since most modern power grids meet the N-1 contingency criterion. However, if two or
more components are tripped, the power flow carried by these components will be
transferred to nearby components. If the nearby lines are pushed beyond their line ratings,
these lines will be tripped as well, and more lines would be pushed into an overload
condition. In this way, cascading failures may propagate in the power grid. The cascading
failure will stop if all the transmission lines are tripped or no line is overloaded. In the
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worst condition, the entire power grid will collapse due to the cascading failure.

So far, several power system cascading failure models have been proposed to investigate
the mechanism of cascading failures, some of the representative models are the OPA
model [21], the improved OPA model [22], the hidden failure model [23], and so on.
Some representative cascading failure simulation platforms are summarized and their
modeling features are listed in Table 1-1 [24]. These platforms are able to simulate the
development of cascading failures to some degree. Each platform has its own
characteristics, for example, the OPA model is able to reveal the influence of slow
dynamics due to the upgrade of the power grid [25], and the hidden failure model can be
used to simulate the hidden failures of relay protection systems in the power grid [26].
The TRELSS cascading model has been adopted by the industry to deal with cascading
failures because it contains detailed built-in modules for studying AC power flow,
voltage collapse, approximate protection functions, and operator actions [27].
Table 1-1 Major features of different simulation platforms

Platform
Function
Overload
Islanding
Under frequency
load shed
Generator
redispatch
Generator trip
Operator response
Blackout time
intervals and repair
AC network
Voltage collapse
Protection Group
Transient stability
Hidden failure
Load increase and
grid upgrade

CFS

MATCASC

Manchester

OPA

√
√

√
√

√
√
√

√
√

√

√

√

Hidden
Failure
√

√

√

TRELSS

CMU

PSA

√
√
√

√
√

√

√

√

√

√
√

√

√
√

√

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√
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In this study, all the cascading failure simulations are modeled and conducted using a
MATLAB based cascading failure simulator (CFS) [28], which is an open source
software tool. The main feature of this cascading failure simulation tool is that every
stage of the cascading failure can be simulated and the loss caused by the cascading
failure can be evaluated. The improved architecture of the CFS is shown in Figure 1-1.
This software is mainly composed of four parts [28]:

1)

Performing power flow calculation based on DC power flow calculation model

and obtaining power flow of each transmission line;
2)

Selecting the target components based on the proposed multiple component attack

model;
3)

Running the main program of cascading failure simulation and

4)

Assessing the damage caused by cascading failures after cascading failures

subside in the power grid.

For multi-component attacks, at the beginning of the cascading failure simulation, target
components will be disconnected from the original power grid and the updated power
grid will be formed, then the DC power flow will be conducted for the updated power
grid to obtain the power flow of each transmission line. The power grid will be inspected
to see if there are any islands generated at each step of the cascading failure simulation
process once the transmission lines are tripped from the grid. In certain instances, new
islands will be generated because the transmission lines which connect the main power
grid and the islands are disconnected. When the new islands are detected, generators and
loads will be dispatched accordingly [28]:
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1)

Initially, the generators in each island will be ramped up or down trying to meet

the load demand. The effect of the dispatch scheme is limited by the capacity of the
generating units, the ramp rate and ramp time.
2)

Secondly, after the dispatching process in each island is finished, if the capacity

of generators are still greater than the demand of loads, generators will be tripped in the
following order: the smallest generator will be tripped first until the generated power is
less than the load demand in the island, then the loads of each load substation will be
shed. The curtailed load amount of each load substation is calculated as follows:
m

 Pdi j  Pdi j (1 

P
k 1
n

P
j 1

where ∆

is the curtailed load of the

generator and

i
gk

(2.1)

)

i
dj

load bus in

is the load demand of the

island,

load bus in the

number of generators and n is the number of substations in the
3)

is the capacity of the
island, m is the

island.

Thirdly, after reaching the supply-demand balance in each subgrid, the DC load

flow calculation will be executed to obtain the power flow and each transmission line will
be checked to see if it is overloaded.
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Figure 1-1 Flow chart of the cascading failure simulator (CFS)

In the cascading failure simulator, overloaded transmission lines are tripped by time
delay overcurrent relay. The time delay overcurrent relay considers various factors which
could lead to transmission line failures such as overheating of lines and human errors [28].

It is assumed that the power flow of line i is

and the power flow limit of line i is

.

During the cascading failure simulation, the transmission line will be tripped as soon as
the accumulated heat exceeds the threshold value

. In the simulator, the value of

is

set to allow the transmission line to continue to run for 5 seconds in the case of
overloading 50%. When line i is overloaded, the tolerable overloading time is calculated
as follows [29]:

∆

0

(2.2)
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Once a transmission line is tripped, the power grid will be updated to see if there are any
new islands or overloaded transmission lines until the end of the cascading failure.

After the cascading failure subsides in each island, the consequences of cascading failure
will be assessed. Here the index “load loss percentage ( )” is adopted. The definition of
is shown as follows [30]:

PL 
where

Pd 0  Pd
Pd 0

is the sum of initial load demand and

(2.3)
is the quantity of the survived load

demand. The bigger the load loss percentage is, the more serious the consequences
caused by the cascading failure are.

In this thesis, some assumptions are made and several definitions are given. The
components in the target collections are considered to be tripped from the power grid
simultaneously. If an attack scheme can make

exceed an expected value, such an

attack scheme will be considered as an effective scheme, and the corresponding
component combination is regarded as a critical component combination. The expected
value is decided by the expectation of the attackers. For instance, if the attackers want to
cause the size of a black out as much as 50%, then the attack schemes which can cause
higher than 0.5 will be seen as effective scenarios.

1.3 Research Objective and Thesis Layout
The main goal of this thesis is to develop intelligent novel methods for identifying critical
components and their combinations to enhance the security and reliability of smart grid.

11
Throughout this thesis we will examine cascading failures caused by critical
combinations of multiple same types and different types of component outages initiated
by either potential cyber, physical or hybrid cyber-physical attacks in the contemporary
power grids.

In this thesis, three critical component combination identification methods are proposed.
In chapter 2, two performance index based critical component combination identification
methods are proposed. In chapter 3, the space-pruning enumerative search strategy is
investigated

to

comprehensively

and

effectively

identify

critical combinations

of multiple same types and different types of components. Further, a more effective
approach, search space conversion and reduction strategy based intelligent search method,
is introduced in chapter 4. The conclusion are presented and the future work are
prospected in chapter 5.
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Critical Component Combination Identification
Methods based on Performance Index
2.1 Introduction
In modern power systems, the N-1 criterion is a basic requirement, which means it is not
possible to cause cascading failures if a single component is compromised. However, due
to the openness and complexity of the envisioned smart grid, it is possible for intelligent
attackers to carry out well-coordinated cyber, physical, or cyber-physical attacks to
initiate cascading failures in order to cause large-scale blackouts. For most attackers, they
usually have limited attack resources; it is natural for them to select the weakest parts in a
power grid as targets in order to achieve the most damaging outcomes with the minimum
cost.

From an attacker's perspective, an intuitive way is to select targets based on the criticality
of individual components. The central idea of this strategy is to sort the components
according to the performance index, then the components with the greatest criticality is
chosen as the targets. Several critical component identification methods have been
proposed, in [31] a critical node identification method based on the centrality approach is
proposed. In [32], a flow transferring index based critical line identification method is
suggested.

This chapter investigates the risk of cascading outages caused by simultaneous multi-
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component attacks. At this stage, for each attack only combinations of multiple same type
of components will be considered, like multiple line attacks, multiple substation attacks,
etc. Critical component combination identification methods based on performance index
will be proposed.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in the following way. The proposed multicomponent attack strategies are presented in section 2.2. Case studies and results are
presented in section 2.3. The summary of this chapter is given in section 2.4.

2.2 Multi-Component Attack Strategies
When allowing for man-made attacks against power grids, if the attackers only have
limited resources to destroy at most N components, it is nature for them to try to find out
the N most critical components based on certain strategies and then damage them to cause
as much loss as possible. To strengthen the power grid protection, these identified critical
components should be well protected. Therefore, it is urgent to develop an effective
identification method to find critical components. In this section, two critical component
combination recognition methods, namely static strategy and dynamic strategy, are
presented. These strategies are described in detail below.

2.2.1 Static Strategy
The flow chart of the static strategy is given in Figure 2-1. In general, there are four steps
to identify the top N critical components using static strategy. First, a criticality index
should be determined. Second, the criticality index of each component should be
calculated based on the selected criticality index. Next, all the components are assumed
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to be ranked in descending order given by the values of criticality index. Finally, the top
N components of the sorted component sequences are chosen as the N most critical
components.

Figure 2-1 Flow chart of the static strategy

The criticality index plays an important role when adopting the static strategy. Thus far,
many criticality indexes have been proposed, like the edge betweenness centrality [33],
the flow betweenness [10], electrical node significance [34], [35], line outage distribution
factors [36], and so on. In this study, two criticality indexes, namely the edge
betweenness centrality and electrical node significance are implemented.

The edge betweenness centrality is able to find out the greatest central links in an
undirected graph. Regarding the topology of the power grid as an undirected graph, a
transmission line can be represented by an edge and a substation can be represented by a
node, then the edge betweenness centrality

of line l can be described as [37]:

Nl

Sij (l )

i 1
j 1
i j

Sij

EBC (l )  

(2.4)
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where

is the number of the shortest routes between node i and node j, and

denotes the total sum of the shortest routes roving through line l ,

is the total number

of transmission lines.

The function of electrical node significance index is identifying the node with the largest
power flows. In a power grid, the electrical node significance

of node j is defined as

follows [38]:

E N (i ) 

Pi
N

 Pj

(2.5)

j 1

where

is the total amount of power flow transferred through node , and N is the sum

of nodes in the power system. To find out the critical nodes based on the index of
electrical node significance, the nodes with the greatest electrical node significance will
be selected.

To find out critical lines based on the index of electrical node significance, the node with
the maximum electrical node significance will be selected first, then the transmission line
with the highest load rate will be chosen as the critical line. Power flow is taken into
consideration in this method, and the line criticality evaluation is built based on the
electrical node significance of each node.

2.2.2 Dynamic Strategy
The flow chart of the dynamic strategy is given in Figure 2-2 and N iterations of selection
processes are needed to identify N critical components. Firstly, a criticality index should
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be determined. In the first iteration, components are rated based on the selected criticality
index, then the first target is the component with the greatest criticality index value. The
topology of the power grid will be updated considering the first critical component has
been removed. Then, in the updated grid, the components will be ranked according to the
criticality index and the component with the greatest index value will be selected as the
second critical component. The process will be repeated for N times to get all the N
critical components.

Figure 2-2 Flow chart of the dynamic strategy

2.3 Simulations and Results
The IEEE 30-bus test system, IEEE 39-bus test system and IEEE 118-bus test system are
adopted here for the cascading failure simulations. The IEEE 30-bus test system is a
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simple approximate representation of the American power grid [39]. In this test system,
there are 30 substations, 44 transmission lines and 6 generators. The IEEE 39-bus test
system is the simplification of the well-known New-England area power grid [39]. This
system includes 39 bus stations, 47 transmission lines and 10 generators. The IEEE 118bus test system represents part of the US Midwestern power grid [39]. This system
contains 118 substations, 54 generators and 186 transmission lines. In the preliminary test,
the data of IEEE 39 and 118-bus test system obtained from MATPOWER are found to be
inconsistent with the N-1 criterion, so the capacity limits of several transmission lines are
enhanced to comply with the N-1 criterion in these systems. Table 2-1 shows the number
of components in each system, where
number of substations,

is the number of transmission lines,

is the number of load buses, and

is the

is the number of

generators.
Table 2-1 The number of components in the adopted test system

Test system
IEEE 30- bus system
IEEE 39-bus system
IEEE 118- bus system

30
39
118

44
47
186

20
21
99

6
10
54

The load rate of a power system has a measurable impact on the process of cascading
failures. Here, the load rate is taken into consideration in the simulation, and the load
demand changes can be calculated as:
∗
where

is the actual load demand level,

from [39], and

(2.6)

is the standard load demand level obtained

represents the load level of each simulation.
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The performance of the proposed multi-component attack strategies is discussed in the
following. The attacked components can be identified by the proposed two critical
component identification methods. Transmission lines are chosen as the target component
based on the following considerations. A modern power grid is composed of a large
number of transmission lines, generators and substations. Typically, large-capacity
generators and critical substations are relatively more heavily protected according to the
safety and security measures. For transmission lines, their spanning length ranges from
dozens of miles to hundreds of miles, and most part of the transmission lines is exposed
to the wild environment, which makes it unrealistic to protect each portion of the
transmission line. However, if one portion of a transmission line is disconnected, the line
will lose its function immediately. Therefore, transmission lines are easy targets for
attackers especially for physical attackers. The proposed multi-component attack
strategies also apply to other power system components such as substations and
generators.

The simulations are conducted based on the cascading failure simulator (CFS). At the
beginning of the simulation, to identify the initial tripped transmission lines, static
strategy and dynamic strategy are used; meanwhile, the edge betweenness centrality and
electrical node significance are adopted as the indices of line criticality.
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Figure 2-3 Comparison of static strategy and dynamic strategy in IEEE 30-bus system

Figure 2-4 Comparison of static strategy and dynamic strategy in IEEE 118-bus system

Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4 show the comparison of the results of static strategy and
dynamic strategy, respectively; and the effectiveness of random attack is also shown here
as a reference. Here, “Random-6” represents attacking six stochastically generated lines.
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As can be seen from the figures, when the number of attacked lines and the line criticality
index are the same, the consequences caused by the dynamic strategy is more serious
than the static strategy, while both of them have led to more severe consequences than the
random attack strategy.

2.4 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, the cascading failures initiated by multi-component attacks are studied
from the perspective of power system security. Static strategy and dynamic strategy are
examined, and two criticality indices including the edge betweenness centrality and
electrical node significance are adopted. Simulations are carried out based on the IEEE
30-bus test system, IEEE 39-bus test system and IEEE 118-bus test system, and the
effectiveness of the proposed strategies is studied and compared.

This work may provide a new horizon for the prevention and mitigation of cascading
failures caused by multi-component attacks. In practice, if the critical components are
properly identified, then corresponding strategies could be developed and deployed to
prevent or mitigate a cascading failure and ultimately prevent a probable large-scale
blackout of electric power systems.
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Space-Pruning Enumerative Search Strategy for
Identifying Critical Combinations of Multiple Same Types and
Different Types of Components
3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2, static strategy and dynamic strategy are proposed to identify critical
components in a power grid. The number of identified critical combinations is limited,
which limits its ability to fully reflect the vulnerability level of the power grid. So, more
effective methods should be developed to identify a more comprehensive set of critical
component combinations.

Electric power systems are comprised of a large number of different components,
including transmission lines, substations, transformers, generators and so on. In chapter 2，
combinations of multiple same types of components are considered. Actually, the
combination of different types of components can be targeted too. Some preliminary
research has been conducted in this field. In [14], the joint line-substation attack scenario
is investigated. In this chapter, the probable vulnerability by attacking multiple different
types of components is studied.

The most direct method to find out the most critical component combination is the
exhaustive enumeration; however, usually it is computationally unacceptable for a large
power system. Here let’s take the IEEE 118-bus network as an example. On average, it
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takes about 0.1 seconds to run a cascading failure simulation using the cascading failure
simulator on a computer with an i5-3230M processor, then it would take about fifty-six
days to enumerate all the four-line attack results on this computing platform.

If the search space can be reduced significantly, the enumerative search strategy can be
implemented to identify the critical component combinations. Specifically, the criticality
of the component can be found based on the enumeration method if the number of
components to be searched is reduced. The calculation time of such an enumeration
method would be feasible especially for a power system which is not very large.

Furthermore, a space-pruning enumerative search strategy for identifying the
critical combinations of multiple same types and different types of components will be
proposed. The main idea of the space-pruning enumerative search strategy is to first get
the criticality of each potential target component from low-order enumeration data, then
the components will be sorted according to their criticality and the components with the
greatest criticality will be selected to form a new search space; finally the enumerative
search will be conducted in the new search space to find out critical component
combinations.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in the following way. The proposed search
space pruning enumeration strategy for identifying critical combinations of multiple same
types and different types of components are presented in the subsequent sections of 3.2
and 3.3 respectively. Case studies and simulation results are given in section 3.4. The
conclusions and future work of this chapter are presented in section 3.5.
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3.2 Space-Pruning Enumerative Search Strategy for Identifying Critical
Combinations of Multiple Components of Same Types
In this section, the space-pruning enumerative search strategy for identifying the critical
combinations of multiple same type of components is proposed. In general, seven steps
are required to identify the critical components. The flow chart of the strategy is shown in
Figure 3-1.

PL

PL

Figure 3-1 The flow chart of space-pruning enumerative search strategy

The two-component enumeration attack data of the target power network needs to be
collected as the first step of the algorithm. Although it takes some time to get the twocomponent enumeration data, the computing time is acceptable even when the scale of
the target system is large. Then the obtained combinations will be sorted in a descending
order by their

, and the top

combinations will be chosen and used for weight

calculation for the components. The value of
the size of the target grid. In general, the value of

is decided by attackers and depends on
increases with the grid size.
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The components from the selected

combinations will be analyzed and the weight will

be calculated. The weighted algorithm is illustrated as follows: all the selected
combinations will be examined and any combination containing that component will be
picked out. The weight of the component represents the number of these combinations.
After the weight of each component is obtained, all components will be sorted in a
descending order by their weights.

Among the sorted components, the top

components are selected as the components to

be enumerated, and the N-components enumerative search will be conducted among them.
After getting the enumerated results, the combination with the highest

will be selected

which is considered as the most effective attack combination, and the components
forming this combination are regarded as critical components. The newly defined search
space comprised of

selected components is termed the pruned search space. In the

pruned search space, the enumerative computation burden is significantly reduced.

3.3 Space-Pruning

Enumerative

Search

Strategy

for

Identifying

Critical Combinations of Multiple Different Types of Components
In this portion of the chapter, we investigated the strategy for attacking multiple different
types of components based on the search space pruning enumeration technique.
Transmission lines and generators are important parts of the power system. Here, the
combinatorial line-generator attack strategy (LGCAS) is investigated as an example of the
attack strategy targeting multiple different types of components.

25
A line-generator combination is comprised of a collection of lines and generators. If a
line-generator combination, which consists of m transmission lines and n generators, is
chosen as the target, such an attack model can be denoted as

.

When a line-generator combination is attacked, the transmission lines and generators in
the collection will be disconnected from the power grid. The attack can be initiated by
physical attacks, cyber-attacks or a combination of both. The transmission lines and
generators in the effective attack scheme is considered to be critical transmission lines
and generators.

For the attackers，the simplest way to get the effective attack schemes is to conduct a
brute-force enumeration. For simplification, the combinatorial line-generator attack
strategy based on brute-force enumeration is denoted by

, the subscript letter

indicates the brute-force enumeration strategy. Even though the best attack schemes can
always be found based on the enumeration method in theory, usually it is not viable
because the enumeration strategy is resource demanding and prohibitively costly if the
target system is large and the number of possible combinations is massive.

This problem is very prominent even in a power system which is not big. Take IEEE 118bus system as an example, on average it takes about 0.1 seconds to run a cascading
failure simulation on a computer with an i5-3230M CPU, so it would take about sixty-six
days to collect all the

simulation results to identify the effective attack

schemes. Hence, enumeration strategy is not practical for this problem, not to mention the
fact that the actual power grid may be far greater than the IEEE 118-bus system.
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3.3.1 Joint Line-Generator Attack Approach based on Reduced Search Space
A joint line-generator attack strategy based on the pruned search space can be proposed
, the subscript “RE” means reduced

in this section. Such a strategy is termed

to identify effective attack combinations, several

search space. When adopting
steps are required. The procedures of

are shown in Figure 3-2.

For the attackers, they usually have some expectation on the attack consequence before
launching an attack. For instance, if the attackers want to make the whole power grid lose
power, the expected value of

is one.
LGCASE11

PL

Figure 3-2 Procedure of LGCASRE

At the beginning of the procedure, the results of

need to be collected. The

computational burden of this step is tolerable. Next, the combinations of
sorted in a descending order by

are

, and the best N combinations are extracted. The value

of N is set by attackers based on the scale of the power grid. In general, the value of N
grows as the target grid size increases.
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Among the N combinations, the transmission lines and generators will be identified and
weighted. The weight of a transmission line is calculated as follows: For each identified
line, all the combinations which contain the line will be examined in the N schemes, and
the weight of this line is the sum of

in the identified scenarios. The meaning of the

weight contains the number of occurrences in the chosen top N schemes along with its
impact. Then the lines are sorted in a descending order by their weights. Calculating the
weight of the generators follows the same procedure.

After the weights are obtained and the components are sorted, the top
transmission lines and top

sorted

sorted generators are chosen independently. Since a

generator with a larger capacity has higher potential to result in an effective attack, the
credibility of critical generators is higher than the critical transmission lines. Thus the
size of generator collections can be somewhat reduced to save the computing time.

The values of

and

need to be increased with the expansion of the grid size. While

the generators in the power plants are generally well protected, transmission lines expand
as wide as hundreds of miles with most of them being exposed to the wild, which makes
transmission lines more vulnerable to attacks. Considering the attack difficulty, a
scenario, which consists of more lines or equal number of generators, will be
simulations can be carried out simultaneously. For

considered. Different

instance, to identify at least one attack scheme which can lead to the value of
0.7,

,

,

,

above

, etc. can be implemented

simultaneously with a search space of reasonable size on a number of computers.
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For a certain

, search is conducted only among the selected

lines and

generators to identify the effective combinations. The search space formed by the
transmission lines and

generators is known as the reduced search space. In the

reduced search space, the

computational time can be reduced significantly

while a comprehensive set of the critical combinations can be obtained.

The

search can be further accelerated by dividing the sorted

lines and

generators into two symmetrical parts. The first part is composed of the lines and
generators with higher weights, and the second part is composed of the lines and
generators with lower weights. The higher weight lines collection is indicated by
and the lower weight lines collection is indicated by
group of higher weight generators and

. Similarly,

represents the

represents the group of lower weight

generators. The search space which is comprised of

and

is termed higher

weight search space.

The higher weight search space will be explored first in the reduced search space during
the process of

search. All the results will be recorded and processed. If one

combination is found to satisfy the expectation, the simulation will be terminated and the
qualified combination will be displayed.

If satisfactory results cannot be found in the higher weight search space,

search

will be performed in the whole reduced search space except for the higher weight search
space which has been searched. If critical combinations still cannot be found in the
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reduced search space, the search process will end and this

is seen as a void

scenario.

It is worth noting that some critical combinations may be omitted based on this method;
however, the result is still meaningful especially for attackers. In the actual case, since it
is more difficult to attack a generator than a transmission line, an attack scheme
composed of more lines and fewer generators could be a more effective option.

3.4 Simulations Results
The performance of the space-pruning enumerative search strategy is studied here. The
space-pruning enumerative search strategy for both the same and different types
of component attacks are simulated on IEEE 30, 39 and 118-bus systems.

3.4.1 A Case Study on Identifying Critical Combinations of Multiple Same Types of
Components based on Enumerative Search
To demonstrate the space-pruning enumerative search strategy for identifying critical
combinations of multiple components of the same type, in this section the enumerative
search method is performed on the IEEE 30-bus benchmark. The case of multi-line attack
is studied here, and all the results of three-line and four-line attacks are presented and
discussed. For conducting further analysis, the collected data need to be appropriately
processed. The procedure of data preprocessing is illustrated as follows.

At first, all the combinations of three-line and four-line will be sorted in a descending
order by their

separately. Then, the top 30 schemes are extracted from the two kinds of
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combinations; the lines in the top 30 schemes will be picked out from the two kinds of
combinations separately and the occurrence frequency (

) of each line will be

calculated. Finally, the lines will be sorted in a descending order by their occurrence
frequencies. The top twenty lines are shown in Table 3-1.

It can be observed that some lines occur frequently in both the top 30 three-line and fourline combinations. For example, the occurrence frequency of line 6 is 8 and 13 in the top
30 three-line and four-line combinations individually. It can be seen that the line
criticality is not greatly impacted by the number of the target lines.
Table 3-1 The statistical data of the top 30 three/four-line combinations

Line
number

three-line

Line
number

three-line

Line
number

four-line

Line
number

fourline

21

14

20

3

7

21

15

3

16

10

19

3

20

16

11

3

7

10

18

2

39

15

44

2

6

8

17

2

6

13

24

2

34

7

8

2

19

9

23

2

24

7

5

2

21

7

22

2

15

5

39

1

8

6

10

2

25

4

33

1

5

6

34

1

11

4

31

1

30

4

33

1

23

3

9

1

16

3

31

1

3.4.2 Effectiveness of the Space-Pruning Enumerative Search Strategy for Multiple
Homogeneous Components Outages
During the section, the proposed dynamic strategy is adopted for comparison. To
compare the effectiveness of the space-pruning enumerative search strategy and dynamic
strategy, the case of multi-line attack is studied. Simulations are conducted based on the
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IEEE 39-bus system with the fixed base load profile. The simulation results are shown in
Figure 3-4. The pruned search space

for attacking different lines is listed in Table 3-2.

Table 3-2 Pruned search space for attacking different lines in IEEE 39-bus system

Total line number
Attacked lines
Pruned search space

47
3
10

4
15

5
15

6
15

In order to verify the effectiveness of the above attack strategies, the best results chosen
from the results of the enumeration strategy are also shown. The results in Figure 3-3
clearly show that the performance of the space-pruning enumerative search strategy is
better than the dynamic strategy. More notable observation is that the performance of
space-pruning enumerative search strategy is highly close to the optimal results obtained
from the enumerative search. This observation proves the validity of the space-pruning
enumerative search strategy.

Figure 3-3 Comparison of the space-pruning enumerative search and dynamic strategies in the IEEE 39-bus system, the
load level is fixed as 1.

Additionally, the space-pruning enumerative search strategy and the dynamic attack
strategy adopt different criticality indices of lines for further testing. The test platform is
the IEEE 118-bus system and the performances of two strategies are shown in Figure 3-4.
The pruned search space

is listed in Table 3-3.
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Table 3-3 Pruned search space for attacking different lines in IEEE 118-bus system

Total line number
Attacked lines
Pruned search space

186
3
10

6
20

Considering it would take too long time to get the enumeration results, the enumerative
search strategy is not implemented.

Figure 3-4 Comparison of the space-pruning enumerative search and dynamic strategies in IEEE 118-bus system,
where the load level ranges from 0.5 to 1.5.

The results of Figure 3-4 prove that both edge betweenness centrality and electrical node
significance are effective criticality indices when the power system operates at the rated
state with a fixed base load profile. It can be seen that the performance of the spacepruning enumerative search strategy will surpass the dynamic attack strategy when the
number of the target lines is large enough.

Also, it is clear that the power grid will become more vulnerable with the increase of load
level, so that under the same attack mode, more serious damage could be caused. With
the increase of power load level，more attention should be paid to the monitoring and
protection function of the power system. For example, if the load level of a power system
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is high in a hot summer afternoon, power dispatchers should concentrate on the real-time
state of the grid, and a contingency response plan for such a situation should be
developed.

3.4.3 A Case Study of Multiple Different Types of Components Combinations based
on Enumerative Search
To demonstrate the space-pruning enumerative search strategy for identifying the
critical combinations of multiple different types of components, here the brute force
search is conducted based on the IEEE 39-bus test system. The results of
,

and

,

are gathered and processed, and the flow of this

process can be illustrated in Figure 3-5.
LGCASE11 LGCASE21 LGCASE12 LGCASE31
LGCASE11

PL

PL

OF
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LGCASE21 LGCASE12 LGCASE

PL

LGCASE21 LGCASE12 LGCASE31

Figure 3-5 Method for processing the enumerated data

The main steps of the process procedure are illustrated as follows: At the beginning all
the combinations in
order by their

,

and

respectively; then for each

Table 3-4 shows the results.

are sorted in a descending
the best 15 schemes are chosen.
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Some observations can be made by analyzing this data. First, the transmission lines and
Table 3-4 Case study of the enumerative search strategy

No.

line

OF

generat
or

OF

schemes

PL

schemes

PL

PL

schemes

1

1

1

31

3

35, 39-33

0.8328

39-33, 34

0.8328

35, 38, 40-33

1

2

11

1

32

3

34, 39-34

0.8328

36-33, 34

0.8316

34, 38, 40-34

1

3

12

1

33

3

35, 36-33

0.8316

39-31, 32

0.8241

34, 36, 39-34

1

4
5

14
16

1
1

34
35

1
1

34, 36-33
20, 39-31

0.8316
0.8241

36-31, 32
23-35, 36

0.8241
0.6858

23, 39, 43-32
23, 36, 43-32

1
1

6

17

1

36

1

20, 36-31

0.8241

1-35, 39

0.6714

23, 36, 43-31

1

7

20

1

37

2

14, 39-32

0.8241

1-36, 39

0.6543

17, 23, 36-38

1

8

32

1

38

3

14, 36-32

0.8241

20-31, 39

0.6476

17, 23, 39-38

1

9

34

1

39

14

2, 39-39

0.7642

14-32, 39

0.6476

14, 20, 36-38

1

10

36

6

2, 36-39

0.7642

39-31, 33

0.6270

14, 20, 39-38

1

11

38

1

1, 39-39

0.7642

36-31, 33

0.6270

11, 12, 36-38

1

12

39

7

1, 36-39

0.7642

41-35, 38

0.6230

11, 12, 39-38

1

13

40

1

9, 10-39

0.7519

39-32, 33

0.6230

4, 14, 36-32

1

14

42

1

3, 39-33

0.7429

36-32, 33

0.6230

1, 13, 39-32

1

15

43

5

10, 12-35

0.7314

17-32, 35

0.6115

18, 36, 43-32

1

generators occur in the high

value

attack scenarios also have high
,

occurrence frequencies in the effective

and

attack

schemes.

Furthermore, in general, if a line or a generator occurs frequently in the top
scenarios, it is more likely to appear in the top

,

and

scenarios. For instance, among all the lines which appear in the top 31
schemes, the lines with the highest occurrence frequency is line 36 and line 39. It can also
be seen that line36 and line39 appear repeatedly in the top

,

and

schemes. It can be inferred from the observation that if the lines and
generators do result in effective

schemes, they are likely to constitute

effective attack schemes when they are incorporated in the following

attack
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schemes. Equally noteworthy are the low occurrence frequency lines in the top 31
schemes. They also have low frequency of occurrence in the top
and

,

schemes.

These observations also apply to the generators with more obvious observations. In
general, the occurrence frequency in the effective attack schemes of a generator is
proportional to its generation capacity.

3.4.4 Demonstration of the Attack Strategy for Combinations of Multiple Different
Types of Components
In this section, the performance of the multiple different types of components attack
strategy is tested in the IEEE 30 and 118-bus test systems. The joint lines-generator
attack is adopted as an example for illustrating the attack strategy targeting
multiple different types of components.

The proposed

is tested. The simulation results and observations are shown in

detail. The performance of the node attack strategy is also presented for comparison. The
node attack strategy adopted here is based on the electrical node significance which
reflects the criticality of the nodes for cascading failures in a power system [34], [35].
When attacking

nodes using the electrical node significance strategy, the electrical

node significance of each node in the power grid needs to be calculated, then the nodes
will be sorted in a descending order according to the electrical node significance. The top
nodes are selected as the targets.
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In this part, a transmission line, a generator or a node is called a component. Specifically,
, a component represents a transmission line or a generator,

when conducting

while a component means a node when referring to the node attack strategy.

Figure 3-6 shows the performance comparison of the two attack strategies. The reduced
search space adopted here is

15 and

5 . The range of the attacked node

number is 2 to 6 for the electrical node significance based node attack strategy. The
corresponding results of the
,

and

are attained from

,

,

respectively.

Figure 3-6 Comparison of LGCAS RE and the electrical node significance based node attack strategy and in IEEE 30bus system

Figure 3-6 demonstrates that
this case. For instance,

outperforms the adopted node attack strategy in
has salient advantages over the node attack strategy

based on electrical node significance when the numbers of attacked components are same.
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Since it is more difficult for the attackers to attack a node than to attack a single
transmission line or a generator,

is a more effective method for the attackers. The
to find effective LGCAS attack schemes.

attackers need to carry out

3.4.5 Effectiveness of the Search Space Reduction Algorithm for LGCAS Attack
Schemes
In this part, the capabilities of the

will be tested in the IEEE 118-bus test
are saved and processed for

system. Initially, all the simulation results of

comparison. The required simulation time is 9.27 hours. Though the simulation time
appears long, it is tolerable for such a complex problem. After obtaining the enumerated
outcomes, all the combinations will be sorted in a descending order by the value of
can be seen from the enumeration data that there are 11 attack scenarios where
are larger than or equal to 0.3090. These

values

values are depicted in Table 3-5.

the best value of

Considering that among the enumeration results of
0.429, the threshold here is set as 0.42 for

. It

.

is

is then implemented to

identify an effective combinatorial attack strategy made up of one transmission line and
two generators.

The top 100 sorted
differences of

,

combinations are chosen as the sampling space. The value
are also considered. Table 3-6 shows the values of

above or equal to 0.309. In the following

which are

, the attack scenarios whose

are above or equal to 0.309 are defined as effective scenarios.

values

38
When

is implemented and the reduced search space is

10 and

5,

three effective attack schemes can be found in the higher weight search space whose
40 and

elapsed time is 1.53 seconds. When the search space is

10 , six

effective scenarios can be identified in the higher weight search space. The simulation
time is about 18.68 seconds. This phenomenon shows that with the increase of the
reduced search space, more effective attack scenarios can be identified.
Table 3-5 The processed data of LGCAS E1 2

Strategy

Elapsed time

No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

0.4279
0.3900
0.3669
0.3669
0.3621
0.3423
0.3284
0.3250
0.3200
0.3116
0.3090

9 hours and 16
minutes

1 2 with different search spaces
Table 3-6 The processed data of LGCAS RE

Strategy
10
5
Strategy

40
10

Elapsed time

No.
1
2
3

0.4290
0.3899
0.3200

No.
1
2
3
4
5
6

0.4290
0.3899
0.3250
0.3200
0.3116
0.3090

1.53 seconds
Elapsed time

It should be noted that all the identified effective

18.48
seconds

results are found in the

higher weight search space. The validity of higher weight search space can be verified
through this observation.
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Given that the enumerative search in the higher weight search space will stop if effective
attack schemes can be identified, it is reasonable to believe that compared with the higher
weight search space, more critical combinations can be identified in the reduced search
space while the consumed time is not significantly increased.

3.5 Conclusions and Future Work
Concluding this chapter, a study of the attack strategy for multiple same types or different
types of components based on the space-pruning enumerative search strategy has been
carried out.

The IEEE 30-bus, 39-bus and 118-bus test systems are used for the simulation studies. In
these test systems, the proposed attack strategy along with the reduced search space
algorithm has turned out to be effective. The case of multi-line attacks is studied as an
example of the space-pruning enumerative search strategy based attack strategy targeting
the same types of components. The combinatorial line-generator attack strategy (LGCAS)
is investigated as an example of the attack strategy targeting the multiple different types
of components. To identify an effective joint line-generator attack strategy, the search
space reduction based combinatorial line-generator attack strategy is proposed. This
strategy can also be extended to identify other critical combinations of multiple different
types of components.

In future studies, the space pruning method will be further improved. Prevention and
mitigation methods can be developed based on this work to reduce the impact of multicomponent attacks which may initiate disastrous cascading failures.
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Search Space Conversion and Reduction Strategy
based Intelligent Search Method
4.1 Introduction
As previously stated, it is essential to identify critical component combinations on power
system vulnerability analysis. Several methods can be adopted to identify critical
component combinations. The simplest way is the brute-force enumeration method.
Theoretically, all the critical combinations can be identified based on this method with
the disadvantage of a heavy computational burden which is impractical especially for a
large-scale power grid. As introduced in the previous two chapters, static strategy,
dynamic strategy and space pruning enumerative search strategy produce the critical
component combination identification method which can also be adopted to identify
critical component combinations.

For the target problem, a power grid can be regarded as a black box in some sense. All
possible target component combinations are the inputs and the critical component
combinations can be seen as optimal solutions. The goal of critical components
combination identification is to find out a few key combinations from a huge, high
dimensional and nonlinear search space which makes it difficult for traditional
identification methods to swiftly and comprehensively obtain critical combinations. The
intelligent search algorithm is an effective approach to this problem. Reasonable
solutions can be identified quickly in a large search space by using an intelligent search
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algorithm. Therefore, an intelligent algorithm is a good choice to identify the critical line
combinations. Specially, an improved PSO algorithm is proposed for critical component
combination identification in this chapter.

In order to further enhance the efficiency of intelligent search, a space conversion and
reduction strategy based intelligent search method (SCRIS) is proposed. This strategy
includes the following aspects: first the criticality of each component is obtained from the
sampling results, then the components will be sorted according to their criticality and the
components with the greatest criticality will be selected to form a new component space;
finally intelligent search will be conducted in the new search space to identify critical
component combinations.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in the following way. Section 4.2 introduces
the effective component combination sampling method, and section 4.3 describes the
weight calculation and new search space generation approach. Case studies and results
are presented in section 4.4. The conclusions and future work of this chapter are given in
section 4.5.

4.2 Effective Component Combination Sampling Method
A practical power grid is usually composed of thousands of substations and transmission
lines. Let’s assume there are

substations in a real-world power grid. For the binary

encoding based intelligent search algorithms, in order to find critical node combinations,
the size of the search space is 2

, which would be an astronomical figure when

is

large. Such a search space is too large for the traditional intelligent search algorithms.
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The irregular distribution of critical component combinations in the search space makes
the situation even worse. Limited by the performance of the traditional intelligent search
algorithm, it is difficult for them to find the critical component combinations efficiently
and effectively within an acceptable time scale.

Considering the number of the components in a power grid is assigned randomly, to
reduce the difficulty of performing intelligent search, the number of components can be
reassigned according to their criticality. In this way, a new search space will be generated
in which the distribution of critical points is more concentrated as compared with the
original search space. The performance of intelligent search algorithm could be improved
by creating such a search space. It is worth pointing out that the criticality of the
components does not need to be strictly precise, and the function of the converted space
is to gather critical particles in a relatively concentrated area.

Although the sorted space is beneficial to improving the search performance, the search
space is too large to identify critical component combinations for a large scale power grid.
As mentioned before, in the resorted search space which is composed of the ranked
components, there are reasons to think that the components with low weights play an
insignificant role in the critical component combinations. Therefore, these components
can be removed from the search space. As a result, in the search space composed of high
weight components, the density of critical component combinations is much greater than
that in the original search space.
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As mentioned above, the validity of reordered search space is largely dependent on the
criticality of the components. To obtain an “ideal” search space, the key issue is to find
an effective way to sort the components so that the target combination can be restricted
within a relatively small region that is close to the coordinate origin.

There are two major critical component sorting methods. One method is sorting the
components according to the criticality index. In the case of line sorting, static strategy
and dynamic strategy that are based on different criticality indices, like edge betweenness
centrality, electrical node significance, and so on, can be adopted as sorting methods. The
problem with this method is that the criticality of components may vary with the change
of the simulation platforms.

Another way to get the criticality of each component is to analyze the sampling results.
The characteristics of the simulation platform and the target power system have been
taken into account during the sampling process. Several sampling methods are applicable
to this problem, including random sampling, Monte Carlo sampling [40], Latin hypercube
sampling [41] and Random Chemistry sampling [28], and so on. While there are multiple
possible sampling methods to obtain the criticality of each component, the random
chemistry method is the most powerful stochastic approach which is developed in [28]
for quickly identifying the critical component combinations that will lead to cascading
failures. Here, the Random Chemistry algorithm is adopted as the sampling tool.
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Random chemistry algorithm
The random chemistry algorithm was originally proposed by Kauffman [42] in the
applications of chemistry, and was further deployed by Eppstein and Hines [28] as a
powerful stochastic tool for identifying critical component combinations in a power
system. The main idea of this algorithm is to test the large randomly created component
collection to find one combination that can initiate cascading failures, then to
continuously reduce the size of the discovered critical combination by random search
until a satisfactory combination is identified. The procedure of the Random Chemistry
Algorithm can be described in the following steps [28].

Step1.
Identify a large set of
that can initiate cascading failures by testing
randomly generated combinations from the target grid.
The set of potential target components in the target grid is denoted as set
size of

is

denoted as set

, and the

. The set of initially selected target components in the power grid is
, and the size of

is S. Before an attack is launched, attackers

usually have an expected attack effect. Here a components combination which may
cause consequences above a certain threshold value

is considered a critical

combination which can initiate a cascading failure. At the beginning of the algorithm,
S components will be randomly sampled from the
obtained set

target components. The

will be tested to see if it can initiate cascading failure. If set

can

cause cascading failures, it will be saved for step 2. If cascading failures cannot be
initiated by set
desired set

, the sampling process will be repeated for at most

times. If the

still cannot be found, the size of S will be doubled (the upper bound
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of S is

) and the above procedure will be repeated until a qualified set

can be

identified.

to set

Step2.
Reduce the selected set
sampling.

will be further reduced to

In this step, the size of the selected set
reduction factor

.

which contains | |/

of set

will be replaced by

set

based on the

(if | |/

is a

is manipulated as an integer) components, will be tested to see if it

could initiate a cascading failure. If a qualified subset

reaches

by randomly

is a small real number greater than one. In the space

reduction process, a subset
decimal, | |/

with smaller size

, where

is identified, then the set

and the above process will be repeated until the size of set
is a small positive integer which limits the minimal size of

. In any iteration, if attempts exceed

times, this RC trial will be considered

to be invalid and another trial will start to identify the qualified combination.

Step3.
Test possible subsets of
identified.
The size of set

until the minimal critical combination is

obtained from step 2 is

component combinations from set

. In this step, all the possible ( -1)

will be tested unless an ( -1) subset could

cause cascading failure. This ( -1) subset will be used to find all the possible ( -2)
combinations. This procedure will continue until an ( -2) combination produces a
cascading failure. This step will be repeated until no smaller combinations could
cause a cascading failure.
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It should be noted that the performance of the RC algorithm is influenced by the specific
type of power grids and the associated parameters [28].

When adopting a RC algorithm as the sampling tool, the sampling process can be
introduced as follows: RC trials will be conducted for a reasonable number of times to
obtain the critical component combinations. To find out a critical combination, the CFS
simulation times vary in different RC trials. For purposes of conducting comparisons at
the same scale, the sampling time is measured by the run times of the CFS, which is
termed as
algorithm

. If the attackers have the ability to attack at most
will be set as

combinations,

components, the RC

. The obtained sampling results may include

component

1 component combinations, and until 2-component combinations.

4.3 Weight Calculation and New Search Space Generation Approach
Component Weight Calculation
The weight of each component will be calculated in the following way after the sample is
obtained. Among the obtained samples, the combinations which can cause consequences
above a certain threshold will be selected for weight calculation. The components occur
in these combinations are weighted according to the following method:

For each of the components that appear in the selected combinations, all the combinations
will be examined and any combination containing that component will be extracted. The
weight of the component represents the number of combinations. After the weight of each
component has been obtained, all components will be sorted in a descending order by
their weights. Since it is possible that each component will not occur in the sampled
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combinations, the components which don't appear in the sampled combinations will be
sorted according to their original index, and then appended to the ranked components.
After the weight of each component has been obtained, all components will be sorted in a
descending order by their weights. A new search space will be generated based on the
sorted components.

Component Space Pruning Strategy
The search performance can be enhanced in the sorted search space; however, in a large
scale power grid, the search space is still too huge and the performance of the intelligent
search algorithm is limited by such a vast search space. As mentioned before, in the
resorted search space which is composed of the ranked components, there are reasons to
believe that the components with low weights play an insignificant role in the critical
component combinations. Instead, in the search space composed of high weight
components, the density of critical component combinations is much greater than that in
the original search space. Assume that the number of the original components is
number of the selected components with top weights is

. Most critical component

combinations will be included in the search space comprised of
moderate size. The component space pruning index

, the

components with

is defined here:
(4.1)

The reasonable value of

can be determined by the conclusion in [28], that is, the

critical components make up only a small portion of the overall components. When
considering five or less component combinations, desirable results can be achieved when
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the value of

is 10%. This value also takes the inaccuracies of component sorting into

consideration. The search space will shrink dramatically based on the pruned components.

Improved PSO Algorithm
After the converted and reduced space has been obtained, intelligent search algorithms
can be implemented in the new search space to identify critical component combinations,
including the taboo search algorithm [43], particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm,
genetic algorithm, simulated annealing algorithm, and so on. Here, an improved particle
swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm is adopted due to its efficient search ability.

The Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm is a well-known evolutionary
algorithm which was proposed by James Kennedy and Russell C. Eberhart in 1995. The
algorithm was inspired by the movement mechanism of a group of birds that are seeking
food. The main idea of this algorithm is to generate a certain number of particles and to
define an objective function first, then in each iteration, the fitness of the particles will be
calculated and compared to generate the best local and global particle. The movements of
these particles are guided by the position of the best local and global particles,
respectively. The performance of this method is heavily dependent on associated
parameters (e.g., iteration time, group size, inertia weight, etc.) and the design of the
fitness function.

Derived from the basic particle swarm optimization algorithm, an improved PSO
algorithm is developed for identifying critical component combinations more effectively.
The following procedure describes the improved PSO algorithm:
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Step1.

Algorithm initialization

In this approach, the dimension of each particle is determined by the number of
target components, each dimension corresponding to one target component. For
example, if the attackers want to attack J transmission lines, then the particle’s
dimension is J. For each dimension, the searching range is determined by the number
of potential target components. Assuming there are P potential target components in
the power grid, the virtual distance of each dimension is [1, P] with interval 1. In the
improved PSO algorithm, the search space has been greatly reduced. If the number
of target components is J, the total search space is
initiated randomly between

,

, where

. The speed of the particles are
and

are the upper and

lower bounds of the speed.

Step2.

Fitness calculation and the best local and global position update

The position of each particle represents a target component combination. After
initialization for each particle, the position will be sent to the cascading failure
simulator as target components. The fitness function can be a different system failure
definition, which is obtained from the simulation results of the CFS, like networkseparation rate [28], net-ability drop percentage [44], load loss percentage ( ), and
so on. The goal of the particles is to find out the maximum fitness value. After
obtaining the fitness value of each particle, the best local particle and the best global
particle of this iteration will be determined. Here

Step3.

Velocity and position update

is adopted as the fitness function.
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The velocity and position of each particle are determined by the following formula
[45]:

vkn1d  wvkn d  c1r1n ( Pbnd  xkn d )  c2 r2n ( Pgnd  xknd )
 n 1
 xk d  xknd  vkn1d

k  1, 2,..., M
d  1, 2,..., D

where w is the inertia weight,

is the cognitive parameter and

(4.2)

is the social

parameter. M is the number of particles in the swarm and D is the dimension of a
particle.

and

are random numbers between 0 and 1. v is the particle velocity and

x is the particle position.

is the position of the best local particle and

is the

position of the best global particle. The superscript n indicates the number of
iterations. The subscript “k-d” represents the d-th dimension of the k-th particle, “b-d”
represents the d-th dimension of the best local particle and “g-d” denotes the d-th
dimension of the best global particle. During the iterations, if the particle's position
exceeds the upper or the lower bound, the particle's position will be generated
randomly. If the particle's velocity exceeds the upper or the lower bound, the speed
will be maintained at the upper or lower bound.

Step4.

Determining whether the algorithm should be halted.

The process of the algorithm will be terminated if one of the following termination
conditions is satisfied:
1) The maximum number of iterations has been reached
2) No new critical combinations can be identified in 50 iterations
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Before fulfilling any termination criterion, step 2 and step 3 will be repeated.

4.4 Simulation Results
In this section, the performance of the proposed space conversion and reduction strategy
based intelligent search method (SCRIS) is test on IEEE 118 and 2383-bus systems based
on MATLAB, the CFS is adopted as the cascading failure simulation tool. The main
simulation results and conclusions are presented in the following subsections.

4.4.1 An Example of Space Conversion
Here is a simple example to demonstrate the effectiveness of the reordered search space.

Figure 4-1 The comparison between original search space and converted search space
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Figure 4-1 shows the comparison between original search space and converted search
space. The top 40 three-line combinations extracted from the enumeration results are
displayed in the two search spaces. It can be seen that the distribution of the top 40
particles in the resorted search space is obviously more concentrated, which means it is
easier for the intelligent search algorithm to identify the critical particles. It can be
expected that this advantage will be more evident for a large power grid considering
multi-component combinations.

4.4.2 Search Space Comparison
In this part, the search spaces of the binary encoding method and the virtual distance
encoding method are compared.

Search Space Comparison between the Binary Encoding Method and Virtual Distance
Encoding method in the IEEE 118‐bus system
The case of the line combinations attack is studied here. The search space of the binary
encoding method and the 10-line combination virtual distance encoding method is listed
in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1 Search space comparison between the binary encoding method and virtual distance encoding method on
IEEE 118 bus system considering different numbers of target components

The number of target
elements
Encoding method
Binary encoding search
space
Virtual distance encoding
search space

3

5

10

2186  9.8*1055

1863  6.4*106

186 5 = 2.2*1011

18610  4.9*1022

It can be seen from Table 4-1 that in the IEEE 118-bus system, the search space of the
virtual distance encoding method is much smaller than that of the binary encoding
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method. For the binary encoding method, the search space is fixed for a specific system.
In a power system, if the number of potential target components is

, the size of the

search space is 2 , which is an astronomical figure even for a not-so-large power system
like the IEEE 118-bus system. As for the virtual distance encoding method, the search
space grows as the number of target components increases; the growth rate is the number
of potential target components. For example, when identifying effective 4-line
combinations in the IEEE 118-bus system, the search space of the virtual distance
encoding method is 118 , while the search space is 118 when identifying effective 5line combinations. In practice, a small portion of critical components can lead to serious
consequences. Take IEEE 118-bus system as an example, serious damage could be
caused if ten transmission lines are compromised. Considering this fact，the number of
target components is usually a single digit, so that the search space of the virtual distance
encoding method is limited to a very small range compared with the binary encoding
method.

Comparison of Search Space Considering Attack Five Nodes in IEEE 30, 39, 118, 2383 bus
systems
Table 4-2 shows the search space comparison between the binary encoding method and
the virtual distance encoding method in different power systems. The case for searching
effective five-line combinations is studied here. Practically, in IEEE 2383-bus system if
five critical lines are compromised, over 90% of load shedding could be caused. Here,
the space reduction ratio (

) is defined as the ratio of the binary encoding search space

and the virtual distance encoding search space.
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It can be seen from Table 4-2 that even in the small IEEE 30-bus test system, the space
reduction ratio is about 44, which means the virtual distance encoding search space is
about 1/44 of the binary encoding search space. With the increase of power grid size, the
space reduction ratio grows significantly. The virtual distance encoding search space is
compressed drastically compared with the binary search space especially in a large-scale
power grid, which is very favorable for conducting efficient intelligent search.
Table 4-2 Comparison of search spaces considering attack five nodes on IEEE 30, 39, 118, 2383-bus systems

Test System

IEEE 30 bus test
system

IEEE 57 bus test
system

IEEE 118 bus test
system

IEEE 2383 bus
test system

Binary Search Space

230

257

2118

22383

Virtual distance
encoding Search Space

305

575

118 5

23835

44.2

2.4 *10 8

1.5 *10 25

2.9 *10 70 0

4.4.3 Performance of Space Conversion and Reduction Strategy
In this section, the performance of space conversion and reduction strategy is tested in the
IEEE 118-bus system. The case of the line combinations attack is studied here. The
random sampling method is adopted here as an example. 10,000 five-line combinations
are stochastically sampled out of
10

1.76 ∗ 10 , the sampling rate is

5.7 ∗

which is obviously a very small rate. Among the sampled combinations, the

combinations that can cause

above 0.5 are selected for line weight calculations. After

obtaining the weight of each line, the top 50 lines are selected to form a new component
space,

.

space

.

lines is

. While the last 50 lines are selected to form another component
, the component space which is comprised of all the ranked 186
.

.

,

. The improved PSO is implemented 50,000 times in
.

and

.

respectively to search for effective 5-
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line combinations. The parameters of the improved PSO is w
10 ,

10 , nop

1,

1,

1,

100 . Figure 4-2 shows the search results. The

horizontal coordinate represents the attack effect. For example, 0.5-0.6 represents the
0.6; the vertical coordinate represents the number of

attack effect’s range: 0.5

combinations in each attack effect’s range.

It can be seen clearly that in

.

, no 5-line combination can be found to cause

above 0.1. Actually, among the 50,000 results obtained from
highest

.

is 0.0165. The statistical data of search results obtained from

shown in Table 4-3. This phenomenon indicates that in

, the
.

is

, almost no 5-line

.

combinations has threatened the power grid. In other words, the transmission lines in
.

are not critical lines.
 50
Table 4-3 Statistical data of search results obtained from S L118
 R 10000  0.5

PL

0-0.0165

0

Amount

4041

45959

The obvious comparison is the search results in
combinations in each attack effect’s range in
corresponding results in

.

. It suggests that in

.
.

. The number of
is far beyond the
.

, most critical

combinations are included. It is worth pointing out that the space conversion and
reduction strategy is effective even in the case of random sampling with a small number
of samples. The performance of the proposed space conversion and reduction strategy
can be improved if a more effective sampling method is adopted and more samples are
collected.

56

PSO in ST118 R50100000.5

PSO in S F118 R186
10000  0.5
50
PSO in S L118
 R 10000

50
Figure 4-2 Search results of PSO in ST118
, 118  50
and S F118 R186
 R 10000  0.5 S L  R 10000  0.5
10000  0.5

4.4.4 Performance Comparison between the Random Sampling Method and RC
Sampling Method
In this section, the performance of the two sampling methods, that is, the random
sampling method and RC sampling method, is tested on the IEEE 118-bus system and the
2383-bus system. The case of searching for effective five-line combinations is studied
here.

Performance Comparison between the Random Sampling Method and RC Sampling
Method in IEEE 118 bus system
The random sampling method and RC sampling method are tested based on the IEEE
118-bus system. For the random sampling method, 20,000 five-line combinations are
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stochastically sampled. Among the 20,000 sampled combinations, the combinations that
can cause

above 0.5 are selected for line weight calculations. For the RC sampling
is set as 0.5.

method,

Table 4-4 The top 50 sorted lines obtained from random sampling and RC sampling

No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Random sampling
Line
No.
8
36
33
38
104
9
21
7
96
107
31
97
51
93
37
17
5
18
127
141
131
126
154
142
95

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Line

No.

39
102
42
70
83
32
29
11
3
73
152
120
61
90
62
48
88
67
50
82
69
26
179
54
89

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

RC sampling
Line
No.
7
9
8
36
31
33
19
21
96
38
32
17
51
54
22
141
16
76
48
183
110
109
178
142
105

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Line
34
37
80
160
55
140
50
174
61
74
172
143
89
15
138
18
121
117
120
90
62
108
27
30
99
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50
PSO in ST118
 R  20000  0.5
50
PSO in ST118
 RC  20000  0.5

PSO in S F118 R186
 20000  0.5

50
Figure 4-3 Search results of PSO in ST118
, 11850
and S F118 R186
 R  20000  0.5 ST  RC  20000  0.5
 20000  0.5

After obtaining the weight of each line from the two sampling methods, the top 50 lines
are selected respectively to form new component spaces, which are denoted as
.

and

.

. Table 4-4 shows the results of the top 50 sorted

lines and the corresponding number obtained from the two sampling methods
respectively. The component space consisting of all the ranked 186 lines obtained from
the random sampling results is termed as

PSO is implemented in

.

,

.

.

.

and

.

respectively

50,000 times to acquire effective 5-line combinations. The parameters of the PSO are:
w

1,

1,

search results.

1,

10 ,

10 , nop

100 . Figure 4-3 shows the
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It can be seen clearly from Figure 4-3 that in general, the number of critical combinations
obtained from

.

are greater than that of

.

, especially when

is high, while the two above results are far better than the results obtained from
.

. This results indicate that the RC sampling method is more effective than

the random sampling method. As a result, in

.

, the distribution of critical

lines is more concentrated so that critical combinations are more easily able to be
searched out.

Performance Comparison of the Random Sampling Method and RC Sampling Method in
IEEE 2383‐bus system
In this section, the performance comparison between the random sampling method and
RC sampling method is conducted in the IEEE 2383-bus system. The number of samples
is 20,000. The sampling and weighting processes are the same as that discussed in the last
section.

After obtaining the weight of each line, the top 50 lines are selected to form the
component spaces, which are denoted as

The PSO is implemented in

.

.

and

and

.

.

.

respectively 20,000

times to obtain the effective 5-line combinations. The parameters of PSO are： w
1,
results.

1,

10 ,

10 , nop

1,

100 . Figure 4-4 shows the search
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It can be seen clearly from Figure 4-4 that the search results in
evident advantage over the results in

.

.

have an

. Compared with the results in the

last section, in the medium-scale IEEE 118-bus system, the performance difference
between the random sampling method and RC sampling method is not large. While in the
larger-scale IEEE 2383-bus system, the performance of the random sampling method is
poor in comparison with the RC sampling method. It can be concluded that, with the
increase of the system size, the effectiveness of the random sampling method declines
rapidly.

50
PSO in ST2383
 RC  20000  0.5

50
PSO in ST2383
 R  20000  0.5

50
 50
Figure 4-4 Search results of PSO in ST2383
and ST2383
 R  20000  0.5
 RC  20000  0.5

4.4.5 Performance Comparison between the Improved PSO based SCRIS and
Random Chemistry
In this part, the performance comparison between the improved PSO based SCRIS and
random chemistry is presented. The simulations are conducted in IEEE 118 and IEEE2383 bus systems.
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Performance Comparison between the Improved PSO based SCRIS and Random Chemistry
Algorithm in IEEE 118 bus system
First the performance of the improved PSO based SCRIS and Random chemistry search
algorithm is tested in IEEE-118 bus system. The case of searching effective five-line
combinations is studied.

The adopted sampling method is the RC sampling method. The RC sampling parameters
are S

20,

40,

0.5, and

20,000. The top 50 and 100 weighted

lines are selected to form the component search space,
.

.

and

11850

. The improved PSO is implemented twice in the ST RC200000.5 and

100
ST118RC
200000.5 1,000,000 times respectively, searching for effective 5-line combinations.

The parameters of the improved PSO are: w
20, nop

50, and

1,

1,

1,

20,

1,020,000. The random chemistry search algorithm is also

executed to identify effective 5-line combinations. The parameters of the random
chemistry search algorithm are: S

40,

20,

0.5, and

1,020,000.

of the PSO and RC are both 1,020,000 for the purpose of comparison under the
same time scale.

Figure 4-5 shows the simulation results. As it can be seen clearly from the figure, the
performance of the improved PSO based SCRIS has comprehensive advantages over the
RC search. For further discussion, the number of identified combinations in each attack
coincides with the range obtained from each method is listed in Table 4-5.
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The search results obtained from PSO in

have comprehensive

.

advantages over the results attained from RC, and the performance of PSO in
.

is similar to that of RC. For both RC and PSO in

five-line combination which can cause
.

, one

above 0.8 is identified, while for PSO in

, no such a combination is identified. The above observations suggest

that the search efficiency decreases with the elevation of
combination which can cause
.

.

. Also, the five-line

above 0.8 is very likely to be excluded from

, which indicates that the efficiency and effectiveness of SCRIS are

sensitive to the value of

. A reasonable

value can not only guarantee the search

efficiency, but also ensures the quality of search results.

 50
PSO in ST118
 RC  20000  0.5
100
PSO in ST118
 RC  20000  0.5

RC

Figure 4-5 Performance comparison between the improved PSO based SCRIS and random chemistry algorithm in
IEEE 118 bus system
Table 4-5 The number of identified combinations in each attack effect’s range obtained from the improved PSO based
SCRIS and random chemistry algorithm in IEEE 118 bus system

Search method
Range of PL

RC

100
PSO in ST118
 RC  20000  0.5

50
PSO in ST118
 RC  20000  0.5
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0.5-0.6
0.6-0.7
0.7-0.8
0.8-0.9
0.9-1.0

4557
632
16
1
0

5644
320
13
1
0

12318
1378
72
0
0

The Improved PSO based SCRIS and Random Chemistry Algorithm in the IEEE 2383‐bus
system
In this section, the performance of the improved PSO based SCRIS and Random
Chemistry search algorithm is tested in the IEEE-2383 bus system.

The sampling method for SCRIS is the RC sampling. The parameters are S
20,

0.5,

80,

50,000. The top 50 and 100 weighted lines are selected to

form component space

.

and

.

. Considering the cascading

failure simulation on the IEEE 2383-bus system is time-consuming, the improved PSO is
run for

.

improved PSO are w

and
1,

.

1,

200,000 times. The parameters of the

1,

20,

20, nop

100，and

250,000 . The random chemistry search algorithm is also executed twice to
identify the critical 5-line combinations. The parameters of the random chemistry search
algorithm are S

80,

20,

0.5, and

550,000.

The simulation results are shown in Figure 4-6, and the number of identified
combinations for each attack effect’s range obtained from each method is listed in Table
4-5. It can be seen from the simulation results that there are comprehensive performance
advantages of the improved PSO based SCRIS with 250,000 times CFS simulations over
that of RC search with 550,000 CFS simulations. The search efficiency of PSO in
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.

decreased to some extent compared with

.

due to the

increase in the search space.

50
PSO in ST2383
 RC 50000  0.5

100
PSO in ST2383
 RC  50000  0.5

RC

Figure 4-6 Performance comparison between the improved PSO based SCRIS and random chemistry algorithm in
IEEE 2383-bus system
Table 4-6 The number of identified combinations for each attack effect’s range obtained from the improved PSO based
SCRIS and random chemistry algorithm in IEEE 2383-bus system

Search method
Range of PL
0.5-0.6
0.6-0.7
0.7-0.8
0.8-0.9
0.9-1.0

RC

100
PSO in ST2383
 RC 50000  0.5

50
PSO in ST2383
 RC 50000  0.5

4083
3451
1209
535
51

19282
21121
11388
7029
1441

36413
37361
21188
10422
1822

This observation indicates that the search efficiency and effectiveness of the improved
PSO based SCRIS is much higher than what is obtained from the RC search algorithm in
a large scale power grid. It can be concluded that the improved PSO based SCIRS is
particularly suitable for quickly identifying critical component combinations in a largescale power system.
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4.5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, the space conversion and reduction strategy based intelligent search
method (SCRIS) is proposed for efficiently and comprehensively identifying critical
component combinations in a power grid. An improved PSO algorithm is adopted to
further enhance the search ability.

The IEEE 118-bus system and the Polish 2383-bus system are used for simulations. The
case of multiple line attacks is studied as an example of the SCRIS based attack strategy
targeting the same types of components. In these systems, the proposed SCRIS as well as
the improved PSO algorithm are validated to be effective. Based on this work, preventive
methods may be developed to prevent multi-component attacks which could initiate
cascading failures. This work also has a great significance in guiding the smart grid
planning.

In future studies, the sampling method, weight calculation method and space reduction
method will be improved to further enhance the performance of the SCRIS. Also, it is of
importance to investigate the influence of

on the SCRIS search performance.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, the cyber-physical vulnerability of next-generation electric power systems
in a smart grid environment is investigated for the purpose of performing power system
cyber-physical security analysis considering the potential malicious attacks against power
grids. The thesis proposes novel methods for effectively and comprehensively identifying
critical component combinations which may initiate cascading failures. Based on the
proposed methods, a holistic methodology could be established for enabling a
comprehensive power system vulnerability analysis, which could provide practical
solutions for the protection, operation, and planning of large-scale smart grids.

Based on the existing criticality indices, static strategy and dynamic strategy are here
used to reflect the vulnerability of power systems. For different application purposes,
more criticality indices could be developed and deployed in vulnerability evaluation.

Considering the diversity of power system components, this thesis also covers a study on
attack strategies targeting multiple same or different types of components based on the
space-pruning enumerative search strategy. In particular, system vulnerability due to
multiple different types of components of power grid is carefully studied which however
cannot be discovered by the conventional vulnerability analysis method developed for
assessing the same types of components.
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The space conversion and reduction strategy based intelligent search method (SCIRS) are
also proposed for comprehensively and effectively identifying critical component
combinations. Through this approach, the potential components are chosen and
manipulated by the sampling strategy and space conversion and reduction strategy so that
the search space shrinks to a smaller range. This technique significantly decreases the
computational burden while having the ability to identify comprehensively vulnerable
portions in the power grid. This method has advantages over traditional intelligent search
approaches for cascading failure analysis. The improved PSO based SCIRS is proven to
be particularly suitable for quickly identifying critical component combinations in a
large-scale power system. Another significant advantage of SCRIS is that the algorithm
is applicable to the power systems with different topologies as well as the diverse
cascading failure simulation platforms.

Based on the proposed methods, preventive actions and response plans can be developed
to diminish the effect of multi-component attacks which could initiate cascading failures.
The results of search space conversion and reduction strategy based intelligent search
method also have a great significance for decision-making support in achieving effective
smart grid management.
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